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Abstract—In multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), 
mobile nodes cooperate with each other without using any 
infrastructure such as access points or base stations. Security 
remains a major challenge for these networks due to their 
features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, 
reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized 
monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Among the 
various attacks to which MANETs are vulnerable, malicious 
packet dropping attack is very common where a malicious node 
can partially degrade or completely disrupt communication in the 
network by consistently dropping packets. In this paper, a 
mechanism for detection of packet dropping attack is presented 
based on cooperative participation of the nodes in a MANET. The 
redundancy of routing information in an ad hoc network is 
utilized to make the scheme robust so that it works effectively 
even in presence of transient network partitioning and Byzantine 
failure of nodes. The proposed scheme is fully cooperative and 
thus more secure as the vulnerabilities of any election algorithm 
used for choosing a subset of nodes for cooperation are absent. 
Simulation results show the effectiveness of the protocol. 
 
Index Terms— distributed algorithm, mobile ad hoc network, 
packet dropping attack, routing security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a wireless ad-hoc network, a collection of mobile devices 
(referred to as ‘nodes’) with wireless network interfaces form 
a temporary network without the aid of any fixed 
infrastructure or centralized administration. MANETs have 
some special characteristic features such as: (i) unreliable 
wireless links used for communication, (ii) constantly 
changing network topologies and memberships of nodes, (iii) 
limited bandwidth of the links, (iv) Low battery lifetime, (V) 
Limited computation power of the nodes that prohibit the 
deployment of complex routing protocols and encryption 
algorithms for security. While these features are essential for 
flexibility and adaptability of various operations in MANETs, 
they introduce specific security concerns like vulnerabilities to 
link attacks including passive eavesdropping, active 
interfering, leakage of secret information, data tampering, 
impersonation, message-replay, message distortion and denial-
of-service. An additional problem in MANETs is the security 
 
 
vulnerability of the routing protocols.  A set of nodes in a 
MANET may be compromised in such a way that it may not 
be possible to detect their malicious behavior easily. Such 
nodes can generate new routing messages to advertise non-
existent links, provide incorrect link state information, and 
flood other nodes with routing traffic thus inflicting Byzantine 
failure in the network. Another common routing disruption 
attack in MANETs has been packet-dropping attack by a 
group of malicious nodes. A group of nodes acting in 
collaboration may drop packets in the network at such a rate 
that the message communication in the network may be 
severely degraded and sometimes even completely disrupted. 
The detection of these malicious nodes may not be easy as 
they work in a group. Although there has been lot of research 
on detection and prevention of such an attack in MANETs, 
most of these schemes have either low detection rate, high 
complexity of detection algorithms, security vulnerabilities in 
the schemes themselves or high rate of false positives (Section 
II). In this paper, a mechanism for detection of malicious 
packet dropping attack in MANETs has been presented. The 
scheme involves a collaborative distributed protocol that 
utilizes complementary relationship between cryptographic 
key distribution and intrusion detection activity for detection 
of malicious packet dropping attack. The scheme has been 
evaluated for its performance by implementing it on the 
network simulator ns-2. The effectiveness and efficiency of 
the proposed mechanism has been compared with one of the 
currently available schemes and is found to have produced 
better results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents some related work on defense against packet dropping 
attack in MANETs. Section III discusses the details of the 
proposed security mechanism. Section IV presents the 
simulations conducted on the mechanism and analyses the 
results. Section V concludes the paper.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of works have been done on the area of ad hoc 
network security especially for detection of packet dropping 
attacks by malicious nodes.  This section mentions some of 
these works.  
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To solve the problem of reduction in the throughput due to 
selfish and malicious nodes in a MANET, Marti et al [1] 
proposed two additional components to the dynamic source 
routing protocol (DSR): watchdog and pathrater. When a 
node forwards a packet, the node’s watchdog verifies whether 
the next node in the path also forwards the same. The 
watchdog does this by listening promiscuously to the next 
node’s transmissions. If the next node does not forward the 
packet, then it is misbehaving. The pathrater assesses the 
results of the watchdog and selects the most reliable path for 
packet delivery. However, this scheme has several drawbacks. 
First of all, overhearing does not always work particularly in 
situations like collisions or weak signals. Secondly, pathrater 
actually does not punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate 
in routing. Rather it relieves them of the burden of forwarding 
packets for others, while their messages are forwarded without 
any problem. In this way, the malicious nodes are rewarded 
and reinforced in their behavior. 
CONFIDANT [2] protocol as proposed by Buchegger et al 
extends the concepts of watchdog and pathrater. In this 
mechanism, misbehaving nodes are not only excluded from 
forwarding route replies, but also from sending their own route 
request. The scheme includes a trust manager to evaluate the 
level of trust of alert reports and a reputation system to rate 
each node. The reports from trusted sources are only processed 
by the nodes. However, it is not clear how fast the trust level 
can be adjusted for a compromised node especially if it has a 
high trust level initially.  
Buttyan et al [3] have advocated the use of tamper-resistant 
hardware on each node of a MANET to encourage 
cooperation. Nodes are assumed to be unwilling to forward 
packets unless they are stimulated to do so. In this approach, a 
protected credit counter runs on the tamper-resistant device. It 
increments by one when a packet is forwarded. It refuses to 
send its own packets if the counter is smaller than a threshold. 
Public key cryptography is used to exchange credit counter 
information among the neighbors and verify if forwarding is 
really successful. However, the availability of tamper-resistant 
hardware is a very vital assumption for the successful working 
of the scheme that involves complexity in hardware design. 
In [4], the authors have presented a security architecture for 
MANETs involving mobile agents. In this scheme, multiple 
sensors deployed throughout the network collect and merge 
audit data implementing a cooperative detection algorithm. 
Sensors are deployed on some of the hosts in the network that 
monitor the network traffic. The selection of these nodes is 
based on their connectivity index and a distributed voting 
algorithm. The detection decisions are taken by mobile agents 
that migrate their execution and state information between the 
different sensor hosts of the network, and finally return to the 
originator host with the results. The authors have proposed 
two different methods of decision-making: collaborative and 
independent. They argue that independent decision-making by 
mobile agents is susceptible to single point of failure 
problems, and therefore the collaborative method should be 
used. The main advantage of this scheme is the restriction of 
computation-intensive operations of the system to few 
dynamically elected nodes. However, most of the available 
mobile agent frameworks are heavyweight and can often be 
the targets of attacks themselves [5].  
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the details of the proposed scheme.  At 
first, some salient features of the scheme are described and 
then the details of the framework and the associated protocols 
are presented. 
 
Fig.1. Key distribution and intrusion detection as complementary functions 
A. Salient Features of the Proposed Scheme 
The proposed framework employs the complementary 
relationship between key distribution and intrusion detection. 
Key distribution in an ad hoc network require a trust 
management scheme to dynamically bind trust relationships 
between the key distribution servers and the clients. Usually, 
the context of this trust relationship is whether the node is well 
behaving or not. This requirement of dynamic trust 
management scheme can be satisfied by an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) that monitors the behavior of the nodes in the 
network for identification of malicious or faulty nodes (Fig. 1). 
The intrusion detection system, in turn, requires the security 
provided by the key distribution process through cryptographic 
techniques. This complementary relationship between key 
distribution and intrusion detection has been deployed in the 
proposed scheme to provide a high level of robustness into it.   
In the bootstrapping phase, the system uses the initial trust 
relationships that may be implemented by location limited side 
channels (LLCs) [7]. This provides the initial security to the 
intrusion detection mechanism, which in turn provides a 
dynamic trust management scheme for key distribution.  
Due to dynamic nature of ad hoc networks, any intrusion 
detection (in this present context, detection of packet 
dropping) process should involve a distributed and cooperative 
protocol among the participating nodes. The cooperation 
between the nodes may be restricted within a small subset of 
nodes that are believed to be more trustworthy, or it may 
involve all the nodes in the network.  Unlike most of the 
existing approaches, the proposed mechanism involves all the 
nodes in the network for working of the distributed protocol 
because the protocol involving a subset of nodes have the 
following drawbacks. Firstly, these schemes require some 
mechanisms to dynamically identify the subset of nodes that 
will participate in the protocol execution. Moreover, such 
schemes fail to take into account the observations of all the 
nodes in the network for identification of occurrences of 
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events, and depend on the observations made by the nodes 
belonging to the subset only. For example, if the neighbors of 
a suspicious node cooperate to detect whether that node is 
really malicious, then the neighbors do not have information 
about the past behavior of the node as observed by other nodes 
in the network because of the dynamic nature of the network’s 
topology. This may lead to incorrect evaluation of the behavior 
of the suspicious node. 
A detection mechanism for malicious packet dropping 
attack that is based on a cooperative algorithm may be 
susceptible to attacks by Byzantine nodes. These nodes may 
make false claims of detecting malicious activities by some 
nodes that are really honest. The proposed scheme is secure 
and will operate correctly even in the presence of such 
Byzantine nodes in the network. 
As in a MANET, every node acts as a router and 
participates in packet forwarding, there is lot of redundancy of 
routing information in the network. This redundancy of 
routing has been utilized in the proposed scheme to achieve a 
high degree robustness in its functioning so that it can work 
correctly in presence of selective packet dropping, packet 
tampering and even in the scenario of transient network 
partitioning.  
B. The Proposed Security Protocol  
In the proposed scheme, every node in the network monitors 
the behavior of its neighbors and upon detecting any abnormal 
action by any of its neighbors invokes a distributed algorithm 
to ascertain whether the node behaving abnormally is indeed 
malicious. The protocol works through cooperation of some 
security components that are present in each node in the 
networks. These components are as follows: (i) monitor, (ii) 
trust collector, (iii) trust manager, (iv) trust propagator, (v) 
whistle blower. The functions of these components are 
described below. 
(i) Monitor: The monitor module of each node passively 
listens to the communication to and from each of its neighbors. 
For detecting packet drops and modifications by the 
neighboring nodes, the monitor module of a node randomly 
copies the incoming packets to its neighbors and checks 
whether the neighbors really forward the packets with contents 
unchanged, or drop them, or modify the contents before 
forwarding them. The collected data is audited by the monitor. 
The deviation from normal behavior of a neighbor is used as 
an indicator for the unbiased degree of maliciousness, because 
this is independent of the past behavior of the neighbor node. 
If this unbiased deviation exceeds a pre-set threshold, the trust 
collector module of the node is invoked.   
 (ii) Trust collector: The Trust collector module of a node 
invokes a majority consensus algorithm among the neighbors 
of a node that has been suspected to be malicious. On being 
activated by its monitor module, the (accuser) node that has 
suspected some malicious activity by one of its neighbors 
challenges the suspicious node to verify its behavior as 
observed by all of its neighbors (Fig. 2). The accused 
(suspected) node on receiving the challenge responds by 
acknowledging the message and sending a verify_behavior 
message to all of its neighbors. The neighbors respond by 
sending the observed value of the degree of maliciousness of 
the accused node. The accused node calculates the group’s 
trust in its behavior using the received values and broadcasts 
the computed group-trust along with the received responses to 
all the neighbors. All the messages are cryptographically 
secured by public key cryptographic mechanisms. The 
messages are also time-stamped so as to prevent replay attacks. 
For computing group trust value from the received responses, 
any consensus-based scheme can be used. In the proposed 
scheme, the difference of the absolute trust values and the 
average degree of maliciousness of the majority of the 
respondents (neighbors) has been taken as the final group-trust 
value of the node. Majority among the neighbors has been 
taken as the larger of the two subsets of nodes obtained by 
partitioning the nodes on the basis of a preset threshold value 
of trust. 
 
Fig.2. Challenge and response mechanism in Trust collector module 
 
(iii) Trust Manager: Each node in the network maintains a 
global trust state containing the suspected nodes and their trust 
values. A table is also maintained that contains a list of nodes 
that has been determined to be malicious and thus should not 
be allowed any access to the network resources. The trust 
manager of a node is responsible for verifying the correctness 
of the group trust certificate received, caching them, and 
updating the global trust state (table) of the node for which it 
has received a new group certificate (from the neighbors of a 
suspected node). While verifying the correctness, the trust 
manager must check whether the response from every 
neighbor node has been correctly considered in computing the 
group- trust by the suspected node, and the messages have not 
been tampered with. This is implemented by cryptographic 
mechanisms. The contribution of a trust certificate in the final 
trust value of a suspected node depends on the global trust 
state of the majority of the neighbors of that node. If the 
majority of the neighbors observe that node is behaving 
maliciously, i.e., its trust value is low, the received trust 
certificate is propagated to all the neighbors of the suspected 
node. If the computed trust value of a node falls below the 
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threshold trust level, a global alarm is raised and the whistle 
blower module is called on. 
For updating the trust value of a node, a cumulative function 
is used. In  (1), oldT , newT , ecertificatT stand for the old trust value, 
new trust value, and the group recommended trust value for a 
node respectively. 
     
( ) ( ) ( ) δβα −−+−=− ecertificatoldnew TTT 111   (1) 
α  and β  represent the weightage corresponding to the old 
trust value and the new trust value of the node respectively. δ  
is the trust replenishment factor over time. β  depends on three 
factors 1α , 2α , 3α and can be expressed as follows: 
                          321 αααβ =                                (2) 
 
The parameter 1α  is given by 
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where, iw , it  are the weightage and the trust value respectively 
of a node belonging to the majority group of the neighbors of 
the accused node. W  is a factor that depends on the size of the 
network. The factor 2α   represents the weightage given to the 
new trust value computed, and 3α  is defined as follows: 
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where k  is the number of certificates received from the 
same group of neighbors or a subset of it in some threshold 
time interval. 
(iv) Trust Propagator: The reputation propagator module 
uses mobility of the nodes for propagating trust certificates. 
Whenever a new trust certificate is computed for a node, it is 
initially distributed to a subset of the neighbor nodes of the 
suspected node. The size of this subset will determine the 
effective convergence time of trust information among the 
nodes that are at present and in near future would be the 
neighbors of the suspected node. At regular intervals, the 
neighboring nodes in the network participate in dynamic 
exchange of certificates.  While the suspected node moves 
through the network, every node in the network would receive 
the certificate through flooding or exchange mechanism. The 
number of hops required to be flooded are determined 
dynamically by making the neighbors of the suspected node 
send their neighborhood information along with the observed 
behavior of the suspected node. The certificates are 
piggybacked on routing packets and thus they involve no 
communication overhead. This flooding and exchange 
mechanism enables detection of tampering of packets and 
provides robustness against packet dropping attacks as a node 
can compare a certificate in its local cache with the copies of 
the same certificate in its neighboring nodes. This scheme is 
also robust against network partitioning as the trust states of all 
the suspected nodes are maintained locally by all the nodes in 
the network. Moreover, due to group certification scheme, the 
number of false alarm is also less. As the number of malicious 
nodes in a network is usually small, the number of trust state to 
be maintained in the nodes are also few. Thus the scheme 
involves a very low storage overhead. 
(v) Whistle Blower: The whistle blower module initiates a 
response action on receiving a global alarm about a suspected 
node. When a global alarm is raised, the alarm message is 
flooded across the entire network followed by the invocation 
of a voting algorithm among the nodes that have recently 
interacted with the suspected node, and a final decision is 
arrived at about the course of action to be taken (i.e., whether 
to isolate the node as it has been detected to be truly malicious 
or to keep it under surveillance as its trust value is still above 
the threshold). Fig.3 depicts the interactions of different 
security modules. 
 
Fig. 3. Interaction among different security modules in a node 
C.   The Packet Dropping Detection Algorithm  
This section presents a formal method of detection of packet 
dropping attack used in the proposed scheme. The algorithm 
proposed in [1] has been extended. In the proposed algorithm, 
each node maintains a watch list of sent and overheard 
packets. Only those overheard packets are added to the watch 
list, which are destined to a neighbor node. Each sent packet is 
added to the watch list with a probability 1p  and each 
overheard packet is added to the watch list with a probability 
2p . In Fig. 4, suppose node A  wants to send a packet to node 
D  via the intermediate nodes B  and C . E  overhears the 
transmission and both A  and E  check whether node B  really 
forwards the packet.  
               
Fig. 4. Communication between different nodes in a MANET 
However, there may be several reasons for which a sender 
node may not be able to overhear a packet sent. The reasons 
are: (i) the packet is maliciously dropped by the neighbor node 
(node B  in this example), (ii) the packet is dropped due to 
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buffer overflow (congestion) at the forwarding node, (iii) the 
packet was forwarded by the forwarding node but there was a 
collision at the destination node (node D  in the example), (iv) 
the packet was forwarded after the preset timeout interval at 
the sender node. If maliciousP , congestionP , collisionP , timeoutP  denote the 
probabilities of the above four events respectively, then we can 
arrive at the following equation: ( )timeoutcollisioncongestionmalicious PPPP ++−= 1             (5) 
Each node estimates the malicious drop probability using 
(5) and updates the probability of a node being malicious using 
the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )maliciousPppedpacketsdroftnPtnP ,1,, 21 αα +−=  (6) 
Where n is the offending node t  is the time interval and 
( )maliciousPppedpacketsdrof , is a function of number of packets 
dropped and maliciousP . In the proposed mechanism, f is chosen 
as an exponential function that initially rises slowly with the 
increase in number of dropped packets.  
For evaluation maliciousP in (5), congestionP , collisionP and timeoutP  
have to be estimated. One approach of estimating congestionP , at 
the forwarding node is to assume a Poisson arrival pattern [6]. 
In the proposed scheme, the congestion at the sending node is 
taken as the estimate of the congestion at the forwarding node. 
This seems to be a better estimate as all the nodes in the 
network are expected to have the same average traffic load on 
them. collisionP  is computed as the percentage of overlapping 
RTS (request to send) packets received. For example, suppose 
node B  sends a packet to node C  and overhears the medium 
for the forwarded packet. Suppose node C  really forwards the 
packet but at the same time node E  also sends a packet to B  
resulting in a collision. Thus node B  will erroneously 
conclude that the packet is dropped by node C . 
collisionP discounts computation of maliciousP  in such cases. This 
computation is based on the fact that node B  would have 
received RTS from both the nodes C  and E .  If these RTSs 
have overlapping duration of bandwidth reservation, there is a 
chance that node  B  will not be able to overhear the 
forwarded packet. timeoutP  accounts for the RTS collisions and 
the noise error in the medium and is estimated depending on 
the conditions of the wireless links. 
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
A. Simulation Environment 
The proposed mechanism has been implemented in network 
simulator ns-2. Malicious behavior is simulated by dropping 
unicast packets at the network layer. In the simulation, all the 
links are assumed to be bi-directional. It is also assumed that 
promiscuous sniffing of packets is possible. This is, of course, 
true in 802.11 technology. The performance of the proposed 
mechanism is compared with that suggested in [1]. The 
parameters used in simulation are presented in Table I.  
B. Results 
The performance of the proposed algorithm in terms of false 
alarm rate and successful detection rate has been compared 
with the watchdog algorithm proposed in [1]. In the 
simulation, each of the packets sent by a node is added to its 
watch list and each packet overheard by a node is put into its 
watch list (i.e., the probabilities 1p and 2p  (Section III C) are 
taken as 1.0). A node is assumed to be malicious if its 
maliciousP value exceeds 0.6. Fig.5 compares the false alarm rates 
as produced by the two algorithms. It is observed that the 
proposed approach reduces the false alarm rate by 50% as 
compared to the scheme suggested in [1]. This improvement is 
attributed to the estimation of congestionP  in the proposed 
mechanism. 
 
TABLE I  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameters Values 
Simulation duration 
Simulation area 
Number of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Traffic type 
Total number of traffic flows 
Bandwidth threshold 
Data payload 
Number of malicious nodes 
Maximum speed of a node 
Host pause time 
1000 s 
1000 m * 1000 m 
50 
50 m 
Random waypoint 
CBR (UDP) 
9 
1 packet/s 
512 bytes/packet 
5 (10% of total) 
8 m/s 
5 s 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Comparison of the false alarm rates 
 
The comparison of the two algorithms in terms of successful 
detection rates is presented in Fig. 6. The decrease in the 
success rate of the proposed algorithm is due to over- 
estimation of congestion at a node that is really malicious and 
is dropping packets intentionally (i.e. not due to congestion). 
This simulation being a random instance, not all the malicious 
nodes are on the active traffic path, and thus not detected by 
the proposed algorithm. However, to avoid this situation the 
proposed scheme uses a cumulative function that assigns 
suitable weights to the past information about the node as well. 
Thus if a node is pretty much localized and consistently drops 
packets, it will be detected by the proposed scheme. 
Each of the 50 nodes in the network is assigned a unique 
integer identification number from (0,49). Fig.7 shows the 
number of nodes that identifies a node as malicious 
Marti’s 
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corresponding to each node in the network. The malicious 
nodes are shown in dark. It can be seen that number of 
complaints is more for nodes that have higher packet dropping 
rates. Some of the nodes that are not malicious are also 
wrongly identified. In fact, these are the nodes that are 
experiencing heavy congestion and thus dropping packets at 
high rates. Thus the scheme also helps in identifying nodes 
that have higher congestion. This helps in reducing the number 
of false alarm as the nodes can take a distributed approach in 
arriving at a consensus to identify the malicious nodes 
ignoring the nodes that are experiencing congestion. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Comparison of successful detection rates 
 
             
 
Fig.7. No. of nodes that finds a node malicious  
 
 
 
Fig.8. False alarm rates for distributed and non-distributed schemes 
 
The effectiveness of a distributed consensus based approach 
in detection of malicious nodes is further depicted in Fig. 8 
and Fig. 9. Fig. 8 shows the comparison of a distributed 
algorithm and an algorithm based on individual observation of 
the nodes. The distributed and cooperative approach reduces 
the false alarm rate by 50% as observed in Fig 8. Fig. 9 shows 
that in terms of successful detection rate both the distributed 
and individual-observation based algorithms have the same 
level of performance. The results thus clearly demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the distributed collaborative algorithm for 
detection of packet dropping attack in an ad hoc network.  
 
 
 
Fig.9. Success rates for distributed and non-distributed schemes 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a distributed algorithm is presented for 
detecting malicious packet dropping attack in MANETs. The 
algorithm works on cooperative participation of all the nodes 
in the network at the network-bootstrapping phase but 
effectively identifies the nodes that behave maliciously as they 
participate in network activities. The redundancies in routing 
information in a MANET are suitably utilized to make the 
detection scheme highly robust and secure against various 
attacks. Due to the use of controlled flooding technique the 
mechanism has also very low communication overhead. 
Simulation carried on the scheme demonstrates its 
effectiveness. As a future scope of work, the mechanism can 
be extended so that the identified malicious nodes are isolated 
from the network and a secure routing protocol can be 
developed utilizing only the trusted nodes in the network.  
REFERENCES 
[1] S. Marti, T.J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing 
misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks”, In Proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pp. 
255-265, 2000. 
[2] S. Buchegger and J-Y.L. Boudec, “Performance analysis of the 
CONFIDANT protocol”, In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Symposium on 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, pp. 226-236, 2002. 
[3] L. Buttyan and J.P. Hubaux, “Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing 
mobile ad hoc networks”, ACM Journal for Mobile Networks (MONET), 
Special Issue on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, summer 2002. 
[4] O. Kachirski and R. Guha, “Effective intrusion detection using multiple 
sensors in wireless ad hoc networks”, In Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 57-61, 2003. 
[5] M.C. Man and V.K. Wei, “A taxonomy for attacks on mobile agents”, In 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Trends in 
Communications, Vol. 2, pp. 385-388, 2001. 
[6] R. Rao and G. Keisidis, “Detecting malicious packet dropping using 
statistically regular multi-hop wireless networks that are not bandwidth 
limited”, In Proceedings of the GLOBE-COM, 2003. 
Marti’s 
algo Proposed 
algo 
Algorithms 
Nodes 
Cooperative 
Independent 
observation 
Algorithms 
Independent  
observation 
Cooperative 
Algorithms 
Success  
rate 
No. 
of 
nodes  
 
Success  
rate 
False 
alarm  
rate 
 Paper ID: 174  
[7] F. Stajano and R. Anderson, “The resurrecting duckling: security issues 
for ad-hoc wireless networks”, In Proceedings of the 7th Security 
Protocols Workshop, 1999, LNCS Vol. 1796, pp. 172-192. 
